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PEOPLE

[Crim. No. 5513.

v.

BRADDOCK

In Bank.

[41 C.2d

Dec. 18, 1953.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. RAYMOND M. BRADDOCK,
Appellant.
[1) Indictment and Information-Charging Offense.-An information is formally sufficient if, in substance, it charges defendant with commission of a public offense in words sufficient
to give him notice of the offense of which he is accused. (Pen.
Code, § 952.)
[2) Id.-Proof and Variance.-To be material, a variance between
information and proof must be of such a substantive character
as to mislead the accused in preparing his defense or likely to
place him in second jeopardy for same offense.
[3) Poisons-Offenses-Indictment and Information-Variance.No material variance exists between information charging
doctor with having prescribed narcotics to a certain man and
evidence that prescriptions were made out to such man's wife,
a fictitious person, where true identity of man as narcotic
officer was made known to doctor, who was present when
officer testified at preliminary hearing; where that testimony
included in detail the circumstances surrounding writing of
prescriptions, with dates and places of those events and names
used, and was sufficient to notify doctor of particular circumstances of offense charged in information; and where doctor
could not have been misled in view of fact that by stipulation the evidence against him was presented by transcript of
proceedings on preliminary hearing with only a slight amount
of additional testimony.
[4) Criminal Law-Plea-Jeopardy-Evidence.-On a plea of
double jeopardy, extrinsic evidence is admissible on trial to
identify crime of which defendant has been convicted.
[5] Poisons- Offenses- Prescribing Narcotics for Persons not
Under Doctor's Treatment.-While it is questionable whether
an accused properly may be convicted of a violation of Health
& Sa£. Code, § 11165, prohibiting issuance of false or fictitious
prescriptions, when evidence does not show that he knew or
should have known that person for whom prescription was
written was nonexistent, such act, even if punishable under
that section, may also amount to a violation of § 11163, forbidding a doctor from prescribing narcotics for one not under

[2] See Cal.Jur., Indictment and Information, § 72 et seq.; Am.
Jur., Indictment and Information, § 176 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1 J Indictment and Information, § 28;
[2] Indictment and Information,§ 110; [3] Poisons,§ 12; [4] Criminal Law, § 198; [5-7] Poisons, § 9; [8-12] Criminal Law, § 50.

Dec.l953]

PEOPLE V. BRADDOCK

795

[41 C.2d 794; 264 P.2d 521]

his treatment, since to hold otherwise would permit a physician
freely supplying narcotics for illegitimate purposes to avoid
being convicted of a felony by simple device of writing prescriptions for a fictitious person.
[6] !d.-Offenses-Prescribing Narcotics for Persons not Under
Doctor's Treatment.-Purpose of Health & Saf. Code, § 11163,
prohibiting a doctor from prescribing narcotics for one not
under his treatment, is to regulate conduct of those persons
who, in practice of their professions, have access to legitimate
sources of narcotics, and not to protect persons who are not
under a physician's treatment for a pathology from faulty
diagnosis or improvident administration of narcotics.
[7] !d.-Offenses-Prescribing Narcotics for Persous not Under
Doctor's Treatment.-A doctor's conviction of violating Health
& Saf. Code, § 11163, in prescribing narcotics for one not under
his treatment must be affirmed, although it might reasonably
be inferred from evidence either that he intended narcotics
go to a person identified to him as sick wife of man before
him or that it should go to such man, and although, despite
man's assurances that he was not using drugs, doctor might
have believed that he was the addict, since in either event gist
of offense was doctor's action in writing prescription for narcotics for person not under treatment for a pathology.
[8] Criminal Law-Defenses-Entrapment.-Where doing of act
is crime regardless of consent of anyone and criminal intent
originates in mind of accused and offense is completed, the
fact that officer furnishes accused an opportunity to commit
the crime or aids him in its commission for purpose of securing evidence necessary to prosecute him constitutes no defense;
there is no entrapment where officer uses no more persuasion
than is necessary to ordinary sale and accused is ready and
willing to make sale.
[9] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-It is not entrapment of a criminal on which the law frowns, but seduction of innocent people
into a criminal career by its officers.
[10] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Where accused has preexisting
criminal intent, fact that when solicited by decoy he committed
crime raises no inference of unlawful entrapment.
[lla, llb] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-In prosecution of doctor
for having sold narcotic prescriptions for use by person not
under his treatment, a determination that doctor had not been
entrapped into making sales is sustained by evidence that,
[8] Entrapment to commit crime with view to punishment therefor, notes, 18 A.L.R. 146, 66 A.L.R. 478, 86 A.L.R. 263. See, also,
Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 36; AmJur., Criminal Law, § 335 et seq.
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although man asking for prescriptions stated that his fictitious
wife used "lots of different kinds" of medicine, it was doctor
who suggested a prescription and it was he who first mentioned
a narcotic; that doctor's suggestion of "T .B." came after initial
prescription had been written and without any previous description by man of wife's illness; that despite lack of any
suggestion by man that drugs were to be used for improper
purpose, doctor advised him to wait sufficient time between
prescriptions to avoid detection; and that, when placed under
arrest, doctor stated that he had been selling prescriptions
because he was in financial straits and needed money.
[12] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Entrapment is a positive defense imposing on accused the burden of showing that he was
induced to commit act for which he is on trial.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial.
Kenneth C. Newell, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution of doctor for violations of Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11163, in issuance of narcotic prescriptions for one not under

his treatment.

Judgment of conviction affirmed.

Isaac Pacht, Arthur F. Larrabee and Rudolph Pacht for
Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Michael J.
Clemens, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-Raymond M. Braddock was tried by the
court without a jury upon an information charging him with
four violations of section 11163 of the Health and Safety
Code.* He has appealed from a judgment of conviction upon
each count and from an order denying his motion for a new
trial. Braddock asserts that a material variance exists between the information and the proof. Another point relied
upon by him is that the evidence, as a matter of law, shows
the commission of the offenses as a result of entrapment.
The four counts are in substantially the same language,
except for the date of the alleged offense. Each of them
*Section 11163 provides: "Except in the regular practice of his pro·
fession, no person shall prescribe, administer, or furnish, a narcotic to
or for any person who is not under his treatment for a pathology or
condition other than narcotic addiction, except as provided in this
.division.''
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charges that Braddock, a licensed doctor of osteopathy, "did
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prescribe a narcotic,
to wit, methadon, to E. J. Mantler, a person not under his
treatment for a pathology." Mantler, an inspector for the
Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, was the principal witness
for the People. The defendant did not testify and presented
no evidence.
The record shows the following facts :
In the company of one Grimes, a person addicted to the
use of narcotics, Mantler went to Braddock's residence and
was introduced to the doctor as "Roy Bates." Mantler
said to him, ''I was hoping you could help me out with my
wife." Braddock asked, "What kind of medicine does your
wife use 1'' Mantler replied, ''Well, she has used lots of
different kinds in the last couple of years." .Asked if he
could bring her to the doctor, Mantler stated that it would
not be convenient or practical. They discussed other subjects
for a few minutes, and then the doctor said, "Oh, well, let's
go inside and I'll write her one."
The three men entered the house, where Braddock seated
himself at a table and produced a prescription book. .At
that moment, one Thomas, known by Mantler to be a narcotic
addict, appeared at the front door. Grimes left the room
and engaged Thomas in conversation, and they disappeared
from Mantler's view. Braddock asked Mantler for his wife's
name and was given the fictitious one of "Julia M. Bates."
"You say she used methadon?" Braddock asked. Mantler
answered, "Yes, and demerol." Braddock said, "I think
methadon is better.''
Told by Mantler that "shots" were preferable to tablets,
the doctor wrote a prescription for 120 cubic centimeters
of methadon to .Julia M. Bates at a fictitious address supplied
by Mantler. "She has T. B. 1" he asked. Receiving an
affirmative reply, he wrote those initials upon the prescription form. ''How much do you want for the favor?'' asked
Mantler. Braddock replied, "How much have you got?"
Mantler told him that he had $30. Braddock said, "I will
take half of it. That will give you enough to get along on."
Mantler gave him the money and departed.
Mantler had the prescription filled, although with difficulty
because of the quantity of the drug indicated. When he
received the substance, he gave it to a chemist for analysis.
Testifying as an expert, the chemist stated that methadon
is a manufacturer's name for ami done, a narcotic enumerated
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in section 11001 of the Health and Safety Code, and included
within the provisions of section 11163 .
.About 10 days later, Mantler again visited Braddock's
home. .After some preliminary conversation, he remarked,
"My wife is not too good." Braddock said, "What was it
she is using, delaudid?" Mantler stated that it was methadon. The doctor said, ''That is not as bad as some stuff.''
He left the room and returned with a prescription book.
"Give me a run down on her again. I can't seem to remember
it." Mantler answered, "Well, she has been using it a
couple of years now." "Is she bad when she doesn't have
it?'' asked the doctor. ''She sure is,'' Mantler replied.
''She nearly runs me up the chimney.''
Braddock made the notation, '' T. B.'' on the prescription
form and asked Mantler what else was wrong with his wife.
Mantler told him that she had an "old hysterectomy." The
doctor said, '' Oh yes. How much of these are you using?''
Mantler looked at Braddock and said, "Not me, Doc. I am
not using any. I have got enough trouble." Braddock remarked, ''I never use anything but alcohol. Morphine makes
me very odd." He then stated, "We won't have any trouble
as long as you keep this far apart.'' Mantler assured him
that he would try to do so. In payment, the doctor accepted
$10, and said, "I ought to see this patient some time." .After
further conversation, he continued, "Give me a call some time
when you are sure your wife will be home and I will drop in.
I should see the patient.''
.About a week later, Mantler visited the doctor's home for
the third time. He entered the house and was invited to
sit down. .After writing a prescription to Julia M. Bates
for a quantity of methadon, he said, "You are kind of shortening up the time." Mantler replied, "Well, Doc, it is not
holding. It doesn't last." The doctor said, "I don't want
you to come here before ten days.'' He again advised Mantler
to wait 10 days, and accepted $10 for the prescription.
On his fourth visit, Mantler was accompanied by inspectors
from the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement and from the Board
of Osteopathic Examiners. The other men waited outside.
Producing a prescription book, the doctor asked him the date
and how he was getting along. Mantler answered that things
were ''pretty tough'' and that he was having trouble ''getting
along with it." He paid the doctor $10 after receiving the
assurance that, if the prescriptions were kept at least 10
days apart, they would have no trouble.
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As he left the house, Mantler handed the prescription to
Blanchard, one of the other officers. Blanchard entered,
identified himself, and asked to see Braddock's records. When
he questioned Braddock as to the identity of Julia Bates he
was told that she was an old patient who had a post pregnancy
condition and a hysterectomy. Braddock added that he had
first contacted her when called to her home. Blanchard said,
"Now, as a matter of fact, Doctor, have you ever seen Julia
Bates?" The doctor admitted that he had not.
Blanchard told Braddock that the person who had been
obtaining prescriptions from him under the name of Julia
Bates in fact was an inspector from the Bureau of Narcotic
Enforcement. He asked the doctor why he had been writing
false and fictitious prescriptions and was told, "Well, I am
in financial straits and I need the money." "Do you
admit then that you h4tve been violating the State and Federal
Narcotic Laws in the sale of these narcotics 1'' he asked.
Braddock replied, ''Certainly, you have got the evidence on
me; what is the use of denying it?" Thereafter, Mantler
returned to the house, identified himself to the doctor, and
showed him his credentials.
Braddock's claim of a material variance is based upon au
alleged conflict between the information, which charges that
he prescribed narcotics to E. J. Mantler in violation of
section 11163 of the Health and Safety Code, and the evidence, which shows that the prescriptions were made out to
Julia M. Bates, a fictitious person.
[1] An information is formally sufficient if, in substance,
it charges the defendant with the commission of a public
offense in words "sufficient to give the accused notice of
the offense of which he is accused." (Pen. Code, § 952.)
[2] To be material, a variance between the information and
proof must be ''of such a substantive character as to mislead
the accused in preparing his defense, or . . . likely to place
him in second jeopardy for the same offense. '' (People v.
Williams, 27 Cal.2d 220, 226 [163 P.2d 692]; People v. Amy,
100 Cal.App.2d 126, 127 [223 P.2d 69]; People v. Moranda,
87 Cal.App.2d 703, 705 [197 P .2d 394].)
[3] In substance, the charges against Braddock are based
upon transactions by which he sold narcotic prescriptions to
M:antler, ostensibly for the use of another person, neither of
them being under his treatment for a pathology. The true
identity of the man supposed to be the husband of Julia M.
Bates was made known to Braddock both by Inspector Blan-
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chard and by Mantler himself, and Braddock was present
when Mantler testified at the preliminary hearing. That
testimony included in detail the circumstances surrounding
the writing of the prescriptions, with the dates and places
of those events and the names used, and it was sufficient to
notify him of the particular circumstances of the offense
charged in the information. (People v. Roberts, 40 Cal.2d
483, 486 [254 P.2d 501] .) Furthermore, by stipulation the
evidence against Braddock was presented by a transcript of
the proceedings upon the preliminary hearing with only a
slight amount of additional testimony. Braddock could not
have been misled.
[4] If Braddock should be tried again on a charge of
violating section 11163 for any of the acts which form the
bases for the present prosecution, he may show former jeopardy by evidence produced in that pr~ceeding. "It is well
settled that on a plea of double jeopardy, extrinsic evidence
is admissible on the trial to identify the crime of which the
defendant has been convicted." (People v. Williams, supra,
27 Cal.2d at p. 226.)
Braddock contends, however, that the evidence does not
support the charge that he violated section 11163 of the Health
and Safety Code, in that the narcotics were prescribed for
a fictitious person. Although the evidence shows a violation
of section 11165 of that code,* a misdemeanor, the argument
continues, a violation of section 11163, which is a felony,
requires that he "prescribe, administer, or furnish" the
narcotic to an existing person.
[5] It is questionable whether an accused properly may
be convicted of a violation of section 11165 when the evidence
does not show that he knew, or should have known, that the
person for whom a prescription is written is nonexistent.
But even if punishable under that section, it does not follow
that such act may not also amount to a violation of section
11163. To hold otherwise would be to permit a physician
freely supplying narcotics for illegitimate purposes to prevent
being convicted of a felony by the simple device of writing
a prescription for a fictitious person. No such result could
have been intended by the Legislature.
The decision in People v. Whitlow, 113 Cal.App.2d 804
[249 P.2d 35], is not contrary to this conclusion. In that
case, the defendant was accused of v~olating section 11163,
*Section 11165 states: "No person shall issue a prescription that is
false or fictitious in any respect."
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but upon motion the offenses charged were reduced to misdemeanors under section 11165 as lesser included offenses.
Upon appeal, the judgment of conviction was reversed upon
the ground that a violation of section 11163 does not necessarily include a violation of section 11165. However, the
court did not hold that conduct proscribed by the former section may never be included within the prohibitions of the
latter one.
[6] The apparent purpose of section 11163 is to regulate
the conduct of those persons who, in the practice of their
professions, have access to legitimate sources of narcotics.
The responsibility of such a practitioner is to prescribe narcotics for legitimate medical purposes. (Health & Sa£. Code,
§ 11162.5.) ''A physician may prescribe for, furnish to, or
administer narcotics to his patient when the patient is suffering from a disease, ailment, injury, or infirmities attendant
upon old age, other than narcotic addiction.
''The physician shall prescribe, furnish, or administer
narcotics only when in good faith he believes the disease,
ailment, injury, or infirmity, requires such treatment."
(Health & Sa£. Code, § 11330.)
If the object of section 11163 were to protect persons not
under a physician's treatment for a pathology from faulty
diagnosis or improvident administration of narcotics, it might
be material in a prosecution under that section to show
whether the person named in the prescription exists. But
that is not the purpose of the statute. It seeks instead to
prevent one having access to narcotics from making them
available, other than for a legitimate purpose, to one under
treatment for a pathology.
[7] From the evidence it might reasonably be inferred
that Braddock intended that the narcotics go to the person
identified to him as Julia M. Bates. Also tenable is the inference of his intention that the narcotics be used by Mantler.
Despite Mantler 's assurances that he was not using the drugs,
Braddock might have believed that he was the addict, as
shown by his references to Mantler 's "shortening up the
time'' between prescriptions and his advice to avoid more
dangerous d:·ugs. In either event, however, the conviction
must be affirmed, since the gist of the offense was Braddock's
action in writing a prescription for a narcotic for a person
not under treatment for a pathology.
41 C.2d-26
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Finally, Braddock contends that the evidence, as a matter
of law, shows unlawful entrapment. From the testimony
of Mantler, he argues, it appears that the sales of prescriptions
were made by him as the result of Mantler 's inducements.
The crime originated in the mind of Mantler, says Braddock,
and except for the officer's persuasion, fraud and trickery,
the offenses would not have been committed.
[8] The many decisions in this state which define the
defense of entrapment were reviewed in People v. Lindsey,
91 Cal.App.2d 914 [205 P.2d 1114], and the law stated as
follows : ''Where the doing of an act is a crime, regardless
of the consent of anyone, the courts are agreed that if the
criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and
the offense is completed, the fact that an opportunity was
furnished, or that the accused is aided in the commission
of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to
prosecute him therefor, constitutes no defense. (Citations.)
If the officer uses no more persuasion than is necessary to
an ordinary sale, and the accused is ready and willing to
make the sale, there is no entrapment." (P. 917.) [9] More
recently it was held: "It is not the entrapment of a criminal
upon which the law frowns, but the seduction of innocent
people into a criminal career by its officers is what is condemned and will not be tolerated. [10] Where an accused
has a preexisting criminal intent, the fact that when solicited
by a decoy he committed a crime raises no inference of
unlawful entrapment." (People v. Schwartz, 109 Cal.App.
2d 450, 455 [240 P.2d 1024]; quoted with approval in People
Y. Roberts, supra, at p. 489; accord People v. Makovsky,
3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [44 P.2d 536] ; People v. Branch, 119
Cal.App.2d 490, 494 [260 P.2d 27] ; People v. Alamillo, 113
Cal.App.2d 617, 620-621 [248 P.2d 421]; People v. Crawford, 105 Cal.App.2d 530, 537 [234 P.2d 181] .)
[lla] In the present case, although Mantler had stated
that his fictitious wife used "lots of different kinds" of medicines, it was Braddock who suggested a prescription, and it was
he who first mentioned a narcotic. Braddock's suggestion
of "T .B." came after the initial prescription had been written
and without any previous description by Mantler of the
nature of his wife's illnesses. Despite the complete lack of
any suggestion by Mantler that the drugs were to be used
for an improper purpose, Braddock advised him to wait a
sufficient time between prescriptions to avoid detection.
Moreover, when placed under arrest, Braddock stated that
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he had been selling prescriptions because he was in :financial
straits and needed the money.
[12] Entrapment ''is a positive defense imposing upon
an accused the burden of showing that he was induced to
commit the act for which he is on trial" (People v. Schwartz,
sttpra, at p. 455; People v. Grijalva, 48 Cal.App.2d 690, 694
[121 P.2d 32]; People v. Lee, 9 Cal.App.2d 99, 109 [48 P.2d
1003)). Where the record shows a conflict in the evidence,
the judgment will not be reversed. (People v. Crawford, 105
Cal.App.2d 530, 537 [234 P.2d 181].)
Braddock concedes that if the officer had asked to purchase
a narcotic prescription for an unlawful purpose, there would
be no basis for a defense of entrapment. He argues, however,
that because Mantler made the purchases for a person supposedly ill, it must be concluded that the seller was persuaded
to violate the law only because of sympathy. However, a
person who violates the law by selling narcotics to an evasive
purchaser is as guilty as one who supplies an addict more
forthright in his demands. That Braddock was not misled
is demonstrated by his studied efforts, entirely voluntary,
to give a cloak of legality to the transaction.
[llb] The testimony, read as a whole, shows Braddock to
have been a willing seller to whom Mantler presented an
opportunity to sell narcotics. By the judgment of conviction
and the order denying the motion for a new trial, the trial
judge determined that Braddock had not been entrapped
into making the sales. For an appellate court to hold otherwise would require it to draw different inferences from the
evidence which amply supports that determination.
The judgment and the order denying defendant's motion
for a new trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I adopt as my dissent in this case the able
and well reasoned opinion prepared by Mr. Presiding Justice
Shinn which was concurred in by Justices Wood and Vallee
when this case was before the District Court of Appeal,
Second Appellate District, Division Three.
"Dr. Raymond M. Bradilock was convicted in a nonjury
trial of four violations of section 11163, Health and Safety
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Code, 1 consisting of the issuance of four narcotic prescriptions
on separate days for one who was not under his treatment.
He was granted probation upon condition that he spend nine
months in the county jail, his motion for a new trial was
denied, and he appeals.
''The case was tried upon the transcript of evidence at
the preliminary and some additional testimony at the time
of trial. The case of the People rested upon the testimony
of one Mantler, an inspector for the Bureau of Narcotic
Enforcement, State of California. Defendant offered no
evidence. Therefore, the evidence is unconflicting.
''Defendant urges the defense of entrapment and also
claims there was a material variance in that the information
charged that the medicine was prescribed to E. J. Mantler,
whereas the proof showed that it was prescribed for a fictitious person, 'Julia Bates.'
''Simply stated, the rule as to entrapment is that the
defense is valid when the intent to bring about the commission of the unlawful act originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into commission of an
offense he would not otherwise have committed in order that
he can be apprehended and prosecuted. (People v. Hall,
133 Cal..App. 40 [23 P.2d 783].)
"Mantler had himself introduced to Dr. Braddock by one
Donald Grimes who, he testified, was a narcotic addict whom
he had known for about a year. (There was no evidence that
Grimes was known to the doctor to be a narcotic addict.)
Grimes took Mantler to Dr. Braddock's residence and introduced him to the doctor as 'Roy Bates.' Mantler said he
hoped the doctor would take care of his wife, to whom he
gave the fictitious name of 'Julia M. Bates,' and he gave
a false address for her. The doctor said he was supposed
to see the patient and asked if she could be brought to him.
The doctor asked what kind of medicine she used and Mantler
said she had used all different kinds in the past two
years. After a conversation about the doctor's dog and his
cat, they entered the doctor's house and the doctor asked
what it was Mantler wanted, whether his wife used Methadon and Mantler replied mostly Methadon or Demerol. A
prescription was written and Mantler paid the doctor $15.
1
' ' '§ 11163.
Narcotic not to be prescribed etc., for person not under
treatment. Except in the regular practice of his profession, no person
shall prescribe, administer, or furnish, a narcotic to or for any person
who is not under his treatment for a pathology or condition other than
narcotic addiction, except as provided in this division.' ''
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During this time a man named Thomas came to the front
door and Grimes went outside and spoke with him. lYiantler
testified Thomas was a narcotic addict in Los Angeles, but
there was no evidence that the doctor was aware of that fact
or even knew of the appearance of Thomas. Ten days later
lYiantler returned. He and the doctor visited in a friendly
manner and in the conversation lYiantler said he had been
lucky in an unlawful poker game. He said his wife was not
'doing so good,' that she had run out of medicine but he
had something for an emergency. The doctor asked if his
wife gave trouble when she was short of medicine and lYiantler
said: 'She very nearly ran me up the chimney of the house
on occasions.' The doctor wrote on his prescription book,
'T .B.' and said : 'What else is wrong with her, I have forgotten what you said the last time' and lYiantler said: 'Well,
she had an old hysterectomy a couple of years ago.' lYiantler
paid the doctor $10. About ten days later he went to the
doctor again, and on another visit ten days later, when the
doctor asked how he was getting along, lYiantler told him
that things were 'pretty tough.' Although l\tiantler testified
that on the first occasion he did not tell the doctor what was
wrong with his wife, it appeared from his cross examination
that he had stated that she had 'T.B.' During the several
visits the conversations were on a friendly basis and the
doctor addressed lYiantler as 'Roy.' Upon the second visit
he asked l\'Iantler to let him know when he could call upon
'Julia Bates' at her home, and upon different occasions
inquired how she was getting on. On one occasion they
watched a world series ball game on television, and upon
the occasion of the second visit lYiantler offered the doctor
$20, but he refused to take more than $10. After lYiantler
obtained the first prescription it was known to other inspectors
in the enforcement office that he had obtained it by false
representations to the doctor that 'Julia Bates' was his wife
al).d was in need of drugs. Upon lYiantler's fourth visit
defendant was arrested by lYiantler and three other inspectors
who seized all his prescription books and records.
''The only question which requires an answer may be
stated as follows : When a narcotic officer conceives a plan
to entrap a physician into a violation of the law, has himself
introduced to the physician under an assumed name, represents that he has a sick wife who is using Methadon or
Demerol (trade names), makes excuses for not bringing her
to the doctor's office when told he should do so, ignores a
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request by the doctor that he call upon her, and obtains
prescriptions in a fictitious name given as that of his wife,
may the doctor be lawfully convicted of violation of the
law which forbids prescribing a narcotic for one not under
his treatment? The question describes the case of Dr. Braddock and our answer is a negative.
"It is scarcely necessary to remark that the agent won
the confidence of the doctor, who was soon calling him 'Roy'
and making friendly inquiries concerning the supposed wife.
He appeared as a man who was burdened with a sick wife,
for whom he generously provided the drugs for the relief
of her distress, when she was unable to visit the doctor. So
the doctor issued the prescriptions for one not under his
treatment, and as a consequence stands convicted of four
counts of felony. But let us see what the agent did: He
conceived the plan of inducing the doctor to commit a crime;
he persuaded the doctor to issue false and fraudulent prescriptions and became accessory to four misdemeanors ( § 11165) 2 ;
he made false and fraudulent representations, a felony under
section 111703 ; he gave a false name and a false address for the
pretended wife, a felony under section 11170.5 4 • This was entrapment. In all our searching we have not found a case in
which a physician was made the victim of such deception. We
cannot say that this is the first time a presumably law-abiding
physician has been induced by false representations of a law
enforcement officer to issue a prescription unlawfully, although
we have been unable to discover another one. This satisfied
us not only that such methods have not been found necessary
in policing the medical profession in prescribing narcotics,
but also that the employment of fraud and deception in the
2
' ' '§ 11165.
False or fictitious prescription. No person shall issue
a prescription that is false or fictitious in any respect.' ''
3
"
'§ 11170. Acts and statements prohibited. (1) No person shall
obtain or attempt to obtain narcotics, or procure or attempt to procure
the administration of or prescription for narcotics, (a) by fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, or subterfuge; or (b) by the concealment of a nia·
terial fact.
" '(2) No person shall make a false statement in any prescriptio:tJ,,
order, report, or record, required by this division.
" '(3) No person shall, for the purpose of obtaining narcotics, falsely
assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, whole·
saler, pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized
person.
" ' ( 4) No person shall affix any false or forged label to a package or
receptacle containing narcotics.' ''
•« '§ 11170.5. False name and address. No person shall, in connection
with the prescribing, furnishing, administering, or dispensing of a
narcotic, give a false name or false address.' ''

Dec.1953)

PEOPLE

v.

BRADDOCK

807

[41 C.2d 794; 264 P.2d 521]

entrapment of physicians has been very generally and properly scorned.
''There is, of course, much more involved here than the
simple question whether Dr. Braddock violated the law. He
stood mute, as was his right, and thus admitted the truth
of Mantler's testimony. It is not because of a claim of
innocence that he relies upon the defense of entrapment,
but because it is the policy of the law not to punish violations
initiated and induced by others for the purpose of bringing
about a prosecution.
''If we were to uphold the conviction of Dr. Braddock it
would mean that we were approving the unlawful enforcement of the law and giving a free hand to law enforcement
officers to use not only deceitful means, but unlawful means,
to entice physicians, and others as well, to violate the law.
The courts have consistently refused to temporize with such
fraud, deceit and direct violation of statutory law as the
record here discloses. The agent provocateur, so despised
that he has been given no name in our language and can
claim no place in our society, had best have the door shut
against him whenever he appears. Our courts have given
no encouragement to his hateful practices, no foothold in
our field of law enforcement from which to extend his contaminating influence.
"It was said in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 [53
S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413, 418, 26 A.L.R. 249]: 'The Federal
courts have generally approved the statement of Circuit
Judge Sanborn in the leading case of B1dts v. United States
( C.C.A. 8th) 18 A.L.R. 143, 273 Fed. 38, supra, as follows:
''The first duties of the officers of the law are to prevent,
not to punish crime. It is not their duty to incite to and
create crime for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing it. Here the evidence strongly tends to prove, if it does
not conclusively do so, that their first and chief endeavor
was to cause, to create, crime in order to punish it, and it
is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the established law of the land to punish a man for the commission
of an offense of the like of which he had never been guilty,
either in thought or in deed, and evidently never would
have been guilty of if the officers of the law had not inspired,
incited, persuaded, and lured him to attempt to commit it," '
and in the concurring opinion of Justices Roberts, Brandeis
and Stone : 'There is common agreement that where a law
officer envisages a crime, plans it, and activates its com-
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mission by one not theretofore intending its perpetration, for
the sole purpose of obtaining a victim through indictment,
conviction and sentence, the consummation of so revolting a
plan ought not to be permitted by any self-respecting tribunal.
Equally true is this whether the offense is one at common
law or merely a creature of statute. Public policy forbids
such sacrifice of decency. The enforcement of this policy
calls upon the court, in every instance where alleged entrapment of a defendant is brought to its notice, to ascertain the
facts, to appraise their effect upon the administration of
justice, and to make such order with respect to the further
prosecution of the cause as the circumstances require. . . .
" 'The doctrine rests, rather, on a fundamental rule of
public policy. The protection of its own functions and the
preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs only to
the court. It is the province of the court and of the court
alone to protect itself and the government from such prostitution of the criminal law. The violation of the principles
of justice by the entrapment of the unwary into crime should
be dealt with by the court no matter by whom or at what.
stage of the proceedings the facts are brought to its attention.
Quite properly it may discharge the prisoner upon a writ of
habeas corpus. Equally well it may quash the indictment
or entertain and try a plea in bar. But its powers do not
end there. Proof of entrapment, at any stage of the case,
requires the court to stop the prosecution, direct that the
indictment be quashed, and the defendant set at liberty. If
in doubt as to the facts it may submit the issue of entrapment
to a jury for advice. But whatever may be the finding upon
such submission the power and the duty to act remain with
the court and not with the jury.'
"It has been the settled policy of the courts to condemn
and repudiate unlawful enforcement of the law. We shall
refer to only a few of the many cases. One in which the
accused was entrapped into procuring and selling a narcotic
is Cline v. United States, 20 F.2d 494 (Eighth Circuit). A
government narcotic agent arrested an addict but promised
to release him if he 'made a case' for the agent. The addict,
pretending to be greatly in need of the drug, persuaded a
friend to induce a chauffeur to obtain morphine for him. The
friend received the morphine from the chauffeur, paid him
$5 and when he delivered the morphine to the addict in
exchange for $5, was arrested and convicted in a jury trial.
It was held on appeal that the evidence sustained only one
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conclusion, namely, that the agent used the addict to trap
the defendant.
"In United States v. Healy, 202 F. 349 (District Court,
Montana) the accused unlawfully sold liquor to an Indian
who was not known by him to be such, but who was used by
government officers as a decoy. After conviction the judgment was set aside, the court saying: 'Though the seller has
violated the statute, he was the passive instrument of the
government, and his is a blameless wrong for which he cannot
be justly convicted . . . . The practice cannot be tolerated,
and a conviction for an offense so procured cannot stand.'
"In United States v. Ernan Mfg. Co., 271 F. 353 (District
Court, Colorado), a government agent wrote the defendant
enclosing $3 and requesting a case of a preparation claimed
to be mislabeled. His purpose was to initiate a prosecution
for an unlawful shipment in interstate commerce. Defendant,
having made the shipment, was prosecuted and it was held,
on the stipulated facts, 'that in the interests of a sound public
policy the defendant should be found not guilty and discharged.'
"In United States v. Lynch, 256 F. 983, (District Court,
New York) the Military Intelligence Department caused one
Fancher to demand money for his influence in the award of
a government contract and when money was offered to him
by the defendant Lynch the latter was arrested and prosecuted
for offering a bribe. The court said that under such circumstances the government was estopped from prosecuting on
the ground that it caused and created that of which complaint
was made. A verdict of acquittal was directed.
"In United States v. Echols, 253 F. 862 (District Court,
Texas), a military police officer persuaded the accused to
procure him a drink in order that he might arrest him therefor.
The prosecution was dismissed although the defendant had
offered to plead guilty. The court upheld the defense of
entrapment and stated as follows (p. 863): 'In what is here
stated there is no intention to excuse persons who yield to
temptation, or to hamper or limit the acts of officers of the
law in detecting crime by any means or device; but the zeal
to detect crime ought not to be so vigorous as to induce officers
to originate and procure the commission of the very offenses
which they are enjoined to prevent. No faithful officer of
the law will be hampered, nor will any criminal be aided,
by the observance of this rule. Its disregard, however, may,
and likely will, subject to persecution and conviction weak
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and spineless persons; who find it hard to resist temptation;
and the government, through the zeal for conviction on the
part of the arresting officer, may become the means of the ruin
of its citizens, instead of their safeguard and protection.
Such a possible result at once establishes the unimpeachable
wisdom of the rule of public policy here enunciated, and requires that the plea of guilty, which the defendant offered
to make, be by the court refused, and the case dismissed, which
is accordingly now done.'
"United States v. Mathues, 22 F.2d 979 (District Court,
Pennslyvania), was a similar case which stated and applied
the rule of entrapment.
''The People contend that the case is the ordinary one
of an officer appearing as a willing buyer of narcotics from
one who is willing to sell to anyone offering himself as a
customer. Cases of this sort are legion, conviction are the
rule and reversals the rare exception. (People v. Makovsky,
3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [44 P.2d 536] ; People v. Lindsey, 91 Cal.
App.2d 914, 916 [205 P.2d 1114]; cf. People v. Gallagher, 107
Cal.App. 425 [290 P. 504] ; Cline v. United States, supra, 20
F.2d 494.) But this is because one who is willing to peddle
narcotics is necessarily a criminal at heart, looking for no
inducement to break the law other than the money he expects
to receive. It is an inescapable inference in such cases that
a willingness to violate the law existed and that the act of
violation was self induced. Persuasion to make a sale does
not taint the transaction with the vice of entrapment unless
it induces the commission of an act that would otherwise not
have been committed. (People v. Makovsky, supra, 3 Cal.2d
366, 370; cf. Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (Eighth Circuit 1921); People v. Gallagher, supra, 107 Cal.App. 425.) If
this were such a case it would occupy but little of our time, for
we would applaud and encourage every energetic and legitimate effort to stamp out the fearful and detestable traffic
in narcotics.
"In Sam Yick v. United States (C.C.A. 9), 240 F. 60 [153
C.C.A. 96], at p. 65, the court stated: 'While it may be true
that the mere aiding of one in the commission of a criminal
act by a government officer or agent does not preclude the
conviction of the party committing the crime, yet where the
officers of the law have incited the party to commit the crime
charged and lured him on to its consummation, the law will
not authorize a verdict of guilty.' It is, of course, conceded
that officer Mantler conceived the plan to induce Dr. Braddock
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to commit a crime. The remaining question is whether, in the
language of the Sam Yick case, the officer 'lured him on to its
consummation,' and we shall see from a discussion of the
undisputed evidence that Dr. Braddock was 'lured on' from
start to finish.
''The question here is whether it could reasonably have been
inferred from the facts in evidence that Dr. Braddock was
willing to write prescriptions for anyone willing to pay a
price, and that he was not induced and persuaded to write
them by the representations of the officer. Such conclusions,
in our opinion, would have been based on nothing more than
suspicion. Mantler kept up his deception to the last. Nothing
occurred to cast doubt upon his representations. The doctor
asked to see 'Julia Bates' at his office and offered to call
upon her at her home, but Mantler succeeded in persuading
him that she could not be brought to the office and avoided
the suggestion that the doctor call upon her. It was not
shown that Dr. Braddock had ever before issued a prescription
for a person who was not under treatment by him, or had
otherwise violated the narcotic law. Mantler made no effort
to obtain a prescription for himself. He evidently believed
deception would be necessary and he played his role straight
through. He was the agent of the state through whom the
state acted. It should not be permitted the state to escape
responsibility for the acts of its agent by merely saying that
although he spoke falsely he was not believed, and that the
doctor was not deceived by his falsehoods into doing something he would not otherwise have done. Every reasonable
inference is to the contrary. That the do.ctor believed the
representations was evidenced by the fact that he acted upon
them. That they were understood by Mantler to be the effective means of accomplishing his purpose was evidenced by the
fact that he persisted in them and improved upon them to
the point of arousing the doctor's compassion. If there was
an intermixture of cupidity, this would not alter the legal
aspects of the case. There is no pretense that the defendant
was moved by purely charitable motives, or that he did not
know he was violating the law, but this does not militate
against the defense of entrapment. Defendant admitted to the
officers, immediately after his arrest, that he had written the
prescriptions because he needed the money, but this means
only that he was the more easily persuaded. The defense of
entrapment is not to be denied to the weak and needy. They
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are the very ones who become the victims of persuasion and
deceit, and who deserve protection.
''Defendant claims only that he was persuaded to violate
the law and that the evidence supports his claim to the exclusion of any other reasonable conclusion. In answering this
contention the People call attention to the testimony of
Mantler that he had previously questioned defendant over the
telephone and accused him of prescribing for addicts, which
accusation defendant resented. Also, mention is made of
the fact that Mantler testified that Grimes and Thomas were
addicts, although it was not shown that defendant had knowledge of that fact or that he even knew the man Thomas. To
give serious consideration to such self serving testimony and
vaguely suspicious circumstances as incriminating evidence
would only magnify the error of the conviction. The mere
presence of Grimes and Thomas was not any sort of evidence
that defendant was a law violator. If they were 'planted'
there by Mantler, as they no doubt were, they could have been
called as witnesses if they would have testified that defendant
had prescribed for them unlawfully. It is therefore to be
presumed that had they been called to testify as to their
relations with defendants, if any, their testimony would have
been adverse to the People. We therefore utterly reject the
argument that as against this presumption the court could
regard the presence of these men as an incriminating or even
a suspicious circumstance. Moreover, the officers had seized
and had possession of defendant's narcotic records. None was
offered in evidence. The assertion of Mantler in the telephone conversation that defendant had been prescribing for
addicts was not ·evidence. Defendant made no admission.
His prescription books, which were required to contain copies
of all prescriptions issued within two years (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11166.10), were in the hands of the officers. It was
to be presumed that if they had been produced in court they
would not have disclosed anything favorable to the prosecution.
''This case takes on added significance from the fact that
in the present day courts and juries must place great reliance
upon the testimony of officers who are charged with the duty
of enforcing the narcotic laws. It is of common occurrence
that convictions are had, and are affirmed on appeal, upon
the uncorroborated testimony of such officers, even in the face
of strong denials by the accused. We do not doubt that confidence in the veracity and motives of the officers is generally
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well deserved, and deem it somewhat more than unfortunate
that any officer should stoop to falsehood and deceit in order
to bring about the commission of a crime for the purpose of
obtaining a conviction. It is shocking to learn that an officer
of the law whose worth depends so much upon a high regard
for the truth and a just regard for the rights of citizens
should conceive and carry out a plan involving so much
duplicity, and even more so that he should be assisted by
other officers who were aware of the deception. That the
narcotic laws are vigorously and systematically enforced we
know from the multitudes of arrests that are made and the
convictions that are had, but it is better that some offenders
should go unpunished than that overzealous officers should
be permitted to indulge in practices which would tend to
demoralize the law enforcement agencies and impair the
confidence and trust of the people and the courts which
it is necessary for such agencies to possess in order to be most
effective.
'"fhis is clearly a case in which there was an entire absence
of evidence and reasonable inference that the accused would
have violated the law had he not been induced to do so by
false representations and persuasion of a law enforcement
officer. We do not believe that any conviction has been sustabled on appeal upon such a record.
"In conclusion, we quote from Woo W ai v. United States,
223 P. 412, 415 [137 C.C.A. 604] : 'Some of the courts have
gone far in sustaining convictions of crimes induced by detectives and by state officers. 'fhis is notably so of the decision in People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274 [70 N.E. 786, 67 L.R.A.
131]. But it is to be said, by way of distinguishing such cases
from the case at bar, that in all of those cases the criminal
intention to commit the offense had its origin in the mind of
the defendant.'
"If the conviction of Dr. Braddock should be affirmed it
would be the only case to be found in the books in which a
conviction was allowed to stand upon undisputed evidence
that an officer of the law conceived the commission of a crime,
used misrepresentation, deceit and unlawful methods to induce
its commission, and when all the evidence and the reasonable
inferences were that but for the machinations of the officer
the unlawful act would not have been committed.
"It is unnecessary to consider the question of variance between the information and the proof.
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''The judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed.''
For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion I would
reverse the judgment.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
14, 1954. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.
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-Accomplice testimony of prosecution witnesses with reference to bookmaking offenses charged was corroborated by evidence of defendant's association with police officials on one
hand and with such prosecution witnesses on other hand, his
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such evidence tended to connect defendant with commission of
bookmaking offenses.
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